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Abstract. The wide development of the mobile and virtualised technologies in the past
decade has further destabilised the already fragile balance between the defenders and the
attackers of computing infrastructures. Coupled with the fact that risk is not controlled by
the defenders but by the attackers, it makes no sense to try and re-actively defend computing
infrastructures. Apropos, in this new socially driven knowledge-based computing era that
corporations are asked to operate in, there is a need to pro-actively defend computing
infrastructures by attempting to control the source of the threats that they face. In this
paper we discuss forensic readiness issues of such a system and we examine how we could
ensure and assure evidential integrity and chain of custody of the near real time intelligence
that the system would be collecting.
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1 Introduction
Corporations continuously develop and use
new business models for maintaining a com-
petitive advantage over their competitors
which are forcing them to accept more risks
for less. They have to operate in a hostile
Information Environment and maintain an
information superiority state at a global
scale. Alas, the resources that are available
to any corporation are finite. There is
indeed a need to control decision makers,
be it human beings or machines, in order to
steer their operations away from the assets
that we are tasked with defending. There is
a need for active defence systems to become
mainstream.
The paper discusses the information envi-
ronment, the importance of forensically fo-
cused system security and how to implement
forensic readiness in protecting corporations
most commodity; its assets.
2 Information Environment
Information encapsulates a wide range of
concepts and phenomena. They relate to
both the processes and material states,
which are closely interrelated [1]. Informa-
tion can be:
– “A product, which encompasses informa-
tion as an object, as resource, as com-
modity
– What is carried in a channel, including
the medium channel itself
– The Contents.”[2]
Vidalis[3] adds: “Information assets are
physical, hardware, software, data, com-
munications, administrative and personnel
resources of a computing system.” An
asset is a single item of ownership having
exchange value. Assets can be tangible or
intangible; they are what all businesses rely
upon for revenue and growth. The secure
protection of a businesses specific assets are
crucial to their survival within the business
world and therefore procedures need to be
in place in order to protect and preserve
asset value. Akin to reality, the virtual space
is the new realm of information warfare and
dissemination of misinformation and this
wholly can be defined as the information
environment. Clausewitz and Tzu [4][5] the-
orised about warfare and military mentality
and strategy in their respective works, and
although the context for use are in different
planes, the theory can still be applied to
virtual information warfare.
The United States Department of Defense
(DoD) has defined the Information Envi-
ronment (IE) as follows: “The information
environment is the aggregate of individuals,
organisations and systems (resources) that
collect, process, disseminate, or act on
information.”[6]
Vidalis and Angelopoulou [6] concur “that
the IE is indeed the interaction between peo-
ple with the systems in place which collect,
analyse, apply, or disseminate information.
Without the mechanisms to provide infor-
mation in a format that can be interpreted,
decision makers are unable to act and pro-
vide an analytical response to a particu-
lar problem or situation.” Alberts et al [7]
“takes the aforementioned IE notion further
by identifying that the IE can be broken
down into three distinct domains: the Phys-
ical Domain; the Information Domain; and
the Cognitive Domain. The three domains
correspond with the conclusions drawn from
the DoDs conception of what the IE entails.”
The physical domain relates to the trans-
mission, infrastructure, technologies, groups
and populations of information. The Infor-
mation domain denotes the location and
where it precedes and the cognitive domain
exists within the minds of the decision mak-
ers. It can be very difficult to define the el-
ements which exist within this domain, be-
cause each individual mind has a different
perception and is thus unique.[6]
3 System Security
The system security of corporations, now
more than ever, requires the design and
most importantly the implementation
of a forensically [8][9][10][11] prepared
network [12][13]. A corporation’s entire
network needs to be implemented in a
manner that accounts for combatting and
defending worst case scenario cyber attacks
[8]. Cyber crime [8][14][15] is aﬄuent and
exponentially growing with the constant
and continuous saturation of technological
advances and widespread consumer avail-
ability; the growth of criminal organisations
utilising the internet and world wide web for
conducting their illegal activities is unfortu-
nately and inevitably in tandem. Therefore
forensic [8][9][10][11] readiness will ensure
that when, and not if, an attack is orches-
trated, it can be effectively defended and
combatted and evidence of any cyber crime
can be collected and preserved [8][9][10][11],
ensuring the integrity of the evidence [16],
which can be presented to the authorities;
thus enabling the appropriate action to
be levelled towards the perpetrators. Most
importantly, a corporation’s assets [3] will
be protected, their business disturbacnde
minimised and the reputation preserved
and intact. The design of a wholly secure
network employed by corporation’s would
require the segregation and inaccessibility
of a corporations assets [3] from outside
the network’s physical infrastructure; the
advantages of employing this method
will undoubtedly increase security and
availibility to the highest level, and most
importantly protect assets. However if an
employee is not within the corporation’s
physical domain and network infrastructure,
access to corporation resources are limited
to the web and mail servers. Therefore
a combination of secure authentication
and forensic [8][9][10][11] monitoring of
the network needs to be implemented. A
standard design that can be implemented
for a secure network [17][18] is illustrated in
figure 1.
The two router combination provides ex-
tra security, as the router positioned out-
side the network (segment 1) carries out ini-
tial packet filtering. The internal network is
protected by another router positioned on
the interior of the network and another fire-
wall (between sement 1 and 2). The De-
Militarised Zone (DMZ) provides further se-
curity to the internal network, where there
is more than one firewall in use to create a
secure network. The DMZ contains the web
and mail servers, so that access remotely via
the Secure SHell (SSH) server is limited to
the DMZ and no access to the internal net-
work, thus protecting a corporations valu-
able assets. The internal network is further
protected by a bastion host and firewall to
restrict access to the file servers, as well as
monitor traffic and usage [17][18]. This is
ideally where forensic monitoring of the net-
work should be administered.
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Fig. 1. Secure Network Design
4 Forensic Readiness
Forensic [8][14][15] monitoring of the net-
work [17][18][12][13], focusing on connec-
tions from outside the network should be
conducted by utilising a methodology that
will enable any evidence to be accepted in a
court of law. Server security, administration
and setup can account for internal discrepan-
cies, but capturing and preserving data re-
garding outside infringements, needs to be
carefully and precisely conducted, so that
it can directly be used by law enforcement
agencies in immediate investigations. The
implementation of live forensic procedure
will accelerate the investigative process, as
well enable the collection and preservation of
much more data than would be available in
simply conducting computer forensic inves-
tigations, once a system is infiltrated and af-
ter cyber-crimes [8][14][15] has be commited.
Furthermore the ramifications of an attack
may not only compromise the security of a
corporations assets, but may even damage
the corporations network beyond immediate
repair. Implementing the ACPO guidelines
[16] within the monitoring of the network as
well as the following procedure, will ensure
that evidence collected cannot be dismissed
by litigation and scrutiny. Utilising the fol-
lowing software tools can enable the collec-
tion of live forensic data, which in the event
of an attempted cyber attack, can be pre-
served and presented against the perpetra-
tors in a court of law.
Collecting evidence [8][9][10][11] using live
capture requires the utilisation and combi-
nation of a number of software resources;
network enumeration tools and methods
[18]; software to monitor the memory and
process usage and a network packet analyser
to view all the associated network traffic
[12][13] with its specific virtual behaviour.
These procedures need to be conducted in
a forensically sound manner [8] to ensure
the admissibility and reliability of the
evidence gathered [16][9][10][11]. Evidence
must be handled and preserved in a foren-
sically sound manner, whilst maintaining
the appropriate chain of custody for the
evidence. All software tools that will be
utilised during live capture procedures need
to be prior tested, documented and above
all licensed [19]. If the administrator or in-
vestigator is using tools that have not been
tested or the correct license has not been
obtained, the validity and integrity of the
evidence and investigatory procedures will
be open for scrutiny by opposing council.[20]
The following steps ensure that the col-
lection of data during forensic monitoring
can be admissible in a computer forensic
investigation and if there is evidence of an
attempted attack, the collected data can be
preserved and presented as evidence.[20]
Live Capture Procedure:
– A log of all actions should be contempo-
raneously maintained [16]
– Ensure tools are legal and licensed. Con-
duct prior testing and document the re-
sults
– Host client needs to possess high process-
ing speeds and access to redundant Inter-
net connectivity
– Installation of the required software for
live capture
– Conduct network enumeration through
software tools
– Create a duplicate of all data. The orig-
inal data collated needs to be unal-
tered[20].
The procedure ensures that as much
evidence as possible is gathered when con-
ducting the live capture, so that there is an
exact record of all actions taken, firstly to
gather the information and data in question
and secondly how this procedure was carried
out, enabling dual verification if necessary
[8][9][10][11]. Furthermore, valuable evi-
dence may be recovered and the validity of
any evidence can be strengthened, whilst
ensuring that evidence-handling techniques
have been observed and implemented.
Network enumeration tools enable an in-
vestigator to gather intelligence, a process
commonly referred to as foot printing[18].
Exhibits that can be collated during intel-
ligence gathering, through the implementa-
tion of network enumeration tools can in-
clude:
– The processes that execute when the
webpage or website is loaded
– The process names and start-up times
– The status of the processes
– Which user executed which process
– The amount of system resources used by
specific processes over time
– System and user processes and services
executing at any given time
– The method by which each process is
normally started and what authorisa-
tion and privileges have been assigned to
those processes
– Hardware devices used by specific pro-
cess
– Files currently opened by specific pro-
cesses
– Media Access Control (MAC) address of
the source transmission, which can iden-
tify the manufacturer and its unique part
identification
– The protocols utilised in the data trans-
mission
– The ports utilised by the source trans-
mission for incoming and outgoing traffic
and
– The operating system and their current
version implemented by the source trans-
mission. [20]
There are numerous tools available that
can conduct network enumeration [18] across
the application of different platforms, which
enables administrators or investigators to
verify and validate the tools that they choose
to utilise in an investigative monitoring
phase.[20]
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Fig. 2. Network Enumeration Tools [20]
The classification of these tools to a par-
ticular operating system platform is not
definitive; WinDump is the Windows equiva-
lent of the TCP Dump tool available through
UNIX platforms and the NMAP and Ether-
Ape tools are only available on UNIX based
operating systems. The other tools can be
applied under either operating system en-
vironments, but can be most effectively
utilised under the specified platforms.
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Fig. 3. Process Analysis for Windows Platform [20]
The open source tools described as well as
the tools that provide a trial version have
been tested, in order to assess their capabili-
ties. A number of the tools applicable under
the Windows platform, that do not provide
a trial version, have not been tested, so their
specified capabilities cannot be validated.
They have been classified according to the
tool desciptions provided by their respected
vendors and websites[20]. The network enu-
meration tools that can be utilised to moni-
tor the processes and their specific usage un-
der a Windows environment are compared
in figure 3. The following figure illustrates
which tools are applicable when gathering
system information on a particular target
utilising a Windows platform.
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Fig. 4. System Analysis for Windows Platform [20]
Figure 5 illustrates which tools are ap-
plicable when gathering network data on a
particular target whilst utilising a Windows
Platform. The network enumeration tools
that can be utilised to conduct process usage
and analysis under a UNIX environment are
compared in figure 6.
Figure 7 illustrates which tools are appli-
cable when gathering system information on
a particular target whilst utilising a UNIX
platform.
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Fig. 5. Network Analysis for Windows Platform [20]
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EtherApe No No No No No 
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Fig. 6. Process Analysis for UNIX Platform [20]
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Fig. 7. System Analysis for UNIX Platform [20]
Finally figure 8 illustrates the tools that
can be implemented in gathering network
data on the intended target utilising a UNIX
platform.
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Fig. 8. Network Analysis for UNIX Platform [20]
In line with computer forensic procedures,
the tools described require administrators or
investigators to practise and learn their func-
tionality for efficient and accurate evidence
collection. The network protocol analysers
provide a wealth of data through utilisa-
tion during online activity, though they are
complex to familiarise with and require the
investigator to have appropriate knowledge
regarding network fundamentals and their
technology [20].
5 Conclusions
To be added later today.....
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